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Zusammenfassung 
Immer wieder ereignen sich in Nachtclubs tragische Brandkatastrophen mit Hunderten von 
Toten. Diese Arbeit gibt Vorschläge zum Schutz vor solchen Katastrophen um damit die 
aktuelle Situation zu verbessern. Um die Faktoren, die den Verlauf einer Brandkatastrophe 
negativ, aber auch positiv beeinflussen, zu identifizieren, wurden Nachtclubbrände der letzten 
17 Jahre analysiert. Als dominierende negative Faktoren wurden der illegale Betrieb von 
Nachtclubs, der Einsatz von Pyrotechnik, die Wahl von Baumaterialien, manuelle und 
automatische Schutzsysteme; die Anzahl von Gästen sowie die Fluchtmöglichkeiten 
identifiziert. Darüber hinaus wurde das Ausbilden der Angestellten als besonders positiv 
befunden. Nie war nur ein einzelner Faktor verantwortlich, immer eine Kombination 
mehrerer. Zusätzlich wurden zwei Evakuierungsexperimente von verschiedenen Nachtclubs 
analysiert, die weitere Erkenntnisse brachten: Das Verhalten des Clubpersonals hat großen 
Einfluss auf die Besucher und selbst wenn das Personenlimit des Nachtclubs nicht erreicht ist, 
können einzelne Räume gefährlich überfüllt sein. Sämtliche Einflussfaktoren werden von den 
gesetzlichen Bestimmungen der USA und Großbritannien behandelt. Vorgeschlagene 
Maßnahmen zum Schutz vor Brand-Katastrophen in Nachtclubs sind die Anpassung der 
Gesetzesgrundlage von Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer an das Niveau entwickelter 
Länder wie USA und Großbritannien; die Verifizierung, dass diese Gesetzesgrundlagen 
ausreichend sind; die konsequente Durchsetzung und Kontrolle der bestehenden Gesetze und 
Kampf gegen Korruption sowie die Sensibilisierung für das Thema Brandschutz und Aufbau 
einer Sicherheitskultur. Darüber hinaus werden Vorschläge für zukünftige Forschungsgebiete 
gemacht. 
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  1. Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Fire has and will always be a threat for humans and their environment. A fire can start due to 
several circumstances. In general, three things are necessary to start a fire; sufficient oxygen, 
combustible fuel and an ignition source [1]. Sufficient oxygen to at least start a fire is given in 
most environments that people can occupy. Combustible fuels can for example be building 
materials, interior finishings, cables or simply a stack of clothes. There are a high number of 
possible ignition sources. Electrical shortcuts, a pyrotechnic display and arson, just to name a 
few, can lead to an ignition. A fire can, in its early stages, be dangerous for people and in its 
later stages to the structure itself. For people, a fire becomes dangerous in an environment 
which makes it difficult to escape before the conditions reach a critical point. These 
environments can be isolated environments such as airplanes, ships or buildings. Most fires 
that led to fatalities or injuries occurred in residential buildings [2]. However, there have been 
many fires leading to a high number of fatalities occurring in non-residential but densely 
occupied buildings.  
Densely occupied buildings can be office complexes, like the World Trade Center or 
industrial facilities as well as assembly buildings such as nightclubs. This thesis will focus on 
the nightclub environment. Throughout history there have been several fatal nightclub fires 
such as the Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire in 1942 resulting in 442 fatalities [3]. In the years 
2000-2004 1350 fires in clubs in the U.S.A. were reported [4]. In the United States, 27% of 
the analysed fires of the time period were reported in clubs, excluding eating and drinking 
establishments as well as religious and funeral properties. 
A nightclub is, as any other company, profit-orientated and therefore the owner tries to 
maximize his profit. Obviously the regulations have to be fulfilled in order to reach a 
minimum safety standard.  
 
1.1 Research Aim and Purpose 
The aim of this master thesis is to develop safety measures for nightclubs. In order to be able 
to do so, critical factors regarding nightclub safety in a fire situation are identified, by 
analysing past nightclub fires as well as experiments and, on that basis, give recommendations 
on how to create safer nightclub environment.  
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1.2 Method  
In order to understand human behaviour in response to a fire emergency, the theoretical 
background is given in chapter 2. In order to identify critical factors that are negatively and 
positively influencing an evacuation in case of an emergency, nine different nightclub fires 
from the past 17 years are evaluated in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on evaluating two 
different evacuation experiments carried out by the Lund University and the University of 
Ulster. Chapter 5 focuses on the current state of the art in nightclub safety, mainly by 
verifying whether the determined factors are addressed in the regulations of the NFPA and the 
BSI. In chapter 6, recommendations to create a safer nightclub environment as well as 
limitations of the study are given. Suggestions for future research are given in chapter 7. 
 
1.3 Definition of a Nightclub 
A nightclub is an entertainment venue that is open until late at night. A nightclub usually has 
a dance floor and plays loud live or amplified music. Some nightclubs have “showy décor and 
elaborate lighting” [5]. A nightclub usually serves drinks, both alcoholic and non-alcoholic, 
and sometimes food [6], [7]. 
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  2. Human Behaviour in a Fire Situation 
2. Human Behaviour in a Fire Situation 
Human behaviour in a fire situation depends on a lot of things such as the individuals 
experience and training regarding fire situations [8]. If people are inexperienced they can 
underestimate the growth rate of a fire and its severity, even experts can fail to estimate fire 
growth or severity [9]. People who have had prior experience with a similar threatening 
situation before tend to be highly sensitized and react very fast upon cues similar to those 
already experienced [10]. 
Other important factors are the affiliation of occupants with familiar places or people as well 
as the question if patrons of whether staff stay in their original role during a drastically 
changing situation such as a fire. 
The degree of focus can also be important. For example are the occupants ignoring a fire 
alarm because they are still dancing, are they influenced by alcohol and therefore have a 
slower reaction time or they perceive danger differently [11], [12], [13]? It is possible that 
people are not committing to an evacuation because they paid a lot of money to enter the club 
or do they just not want to accept that their fun night out has ended [14]. Additionally, 
occupants can be influenced by the behaviour of others [15], [16]. Other aspects that can 
influence human behaviour are age and gender [8]. 
 
2.1 Risk Perception and Fire Growth 
In a fire situation, the correct approximation of fire growth can be of vital importance. Fire 
growth is normally described by the energy that is released: = α*t², where  is the released 
heat, α is the growth factor [kW/s] and t is the time from established ignition [s] [17]. 
From witness statements, as well as experiments, it was found that people are not very good at 
estimating fire growth or the severity of a fire. In the aftermath of the Stardust nightclub fire 
in the Republic of Ireland in 1981 people watched the fire grow as well as the extinguishing 
attempts [18]. During this incident 48 people died and 214 were injured. Similar behaviour 
was reported for the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in the U.S.A. where almost everybody 
had underestimated the severity of the fire even after evacuating the building and looking 
back at the fire. This fire resulted in 164 deaths and 70 injuries [15].  
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This inability to estimate fire growth is being supported by two experimental studies which 
have been carried out by Lund University [9], [19]. In the first experiment 535 people, mainly 
students participated. The 141 participants for the second experiment were students as well 
and therefore representative of a nightclub population. In the experiments the participants 
were expected to estimate the time difference between two video sequences from two 
different growing fires. In the first experiment, a chair and a popcorn machine fire were 
shown and in the second experiment a popcorn machine and a kitchen fire were shown. Both 
studies show that young adults’ estimations of fire growth are very poor. For the second 
experiment it was found that the majority of participants underestimated the time difference 
for the videos of the popcorn fire, thus overestimating the fire growth. The majority of 
participants overestimated the time difference for the kitchen fire, thus underestimating fire 
growth. This is connected to the fire growth itself. A fast growing fire is more likely to be 
underestimated. In reality, a dangerous situation occurs when the fire growth or severity are 
underestimated [9]. In a different study, it was found that out of the people that are exposed to 
a fire, those closest perceive it as more dangerous and are more likely to evacuate earlier than 
those further away [20]. This can be a problem since people further away do not necessarily 
understand the immediate danger and therefore not only block the way for those already being 
exposed to danger but can also delay their own evacuation until it is too late to do so safely.  
 
2.2 Models & Theories 
In this section, a description of different human behaviour models and theories is given. These 
theories are vital to understand human behaviour in fire situations, such as in nightclub fires, 
and to be able to avoid future tragedies by designing. 
 
2.2.1 The Behavioural Sequence Model 
In order to develop the Behavioural Sequence Model Canter, Breaux and Sime carried out 
interviews with fire victims [20], [21]. They found that in the developing phase of a fire 
people had to deal with a lot of uncertainty. The information the fire victims had was very 
limited and ambiguous. The first cues of being in a fire situation were “strange noises, 
unaccustomed behaviour of others, such as running, and […] direct encounter with smoke or 
flames”. It was found that the fire victims constantly became involved in an investigation in 
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order to determine what threat they had faced during the fire. In many cases it was found, that 
in the early stages of a fire, the motivation to reduce uncertainty was stronger than the 
motivation to evacuate. They developed the following behavioural model that shows the 
different steps people go through in a fire scenario, from receiving information, to 
interpreting, to preparing to take action. 
 
Figure 1: The Behavioural Sequence Model; Figure based on [21] 
 
2.2.2 The Egress Time-Line Model 
The Egress Time-Line Model describes the different time steps of a fire situation. It defines 
the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) as well as the Available Safe Egress Time (ASET). 
The RSET includes every step from ignition and detection until the occupants have safely left 
the building. The different steps are the ignition, the detection time, the alarm time, the 
recognition, the response and the movement time. The recognition and response time are 
defined as the pre-movement time. The ASET is the time from the ignition of a fire until 
conditions in the building become untenable for humans [22].  
Occupants should have an adequate time for evacuation before these conditions are reached. 
An adequate time for evacuation means that people in an evacuation process “[…] are not 
exposed to falling structural elements, high temperature, high levels of heat radiation, toxic 
gases or reduced visibility […]” which would make a person incapable of safely evacuating 
[23]. In a standard fire situation, smoke is the biggest threat for humans. Smoke can have 
irritant effects as well as obscure vision and therefore slows down the walking speed. A more 
complex approach regards the Fractional Effective Dose (FED). This dose is the comparison 
 
6 
 
  2. Human Behaviour in a Fire Situation 
between the dose received by the occupant and the dose necessary for incapacitation [24]. In 
order to ensure a safe egress the RSET should be smaller than the ASET [22]. 
 
Figure 2: The Egress-Time-Line Model; Figure based on [22] 
 
2.2.3 The Affiliation Model 
The Affiliation Model was introduced by Sime who studied human behaviour in fire on the 
basis of witness statements [25]. He found that in a threatening situation people “[…] seek 
security with the familiar […]”. He states that in an emergency “[…] attachment takes 
precedence of escape behavior”. Furthermore, he states that the direction of flight will not 
only be related to the location of the fire but also to the location of familiar people or places. 
In case of “[…] an emergency people are even more likely to be drawn towards familiar 
places or people than under normal conditions”.  
Another behavioural aspect he discovered is that individuals tend to respond faster to 
ambiguous cues of a potentially dangerous situation than groups. Latané and Darley give a 
 
7 
 
  2. Human Behaviour in a Fire Situation 
possible explanation by stating that the presence of a group gives the feeling of having an 
increased ability to cope with a fire [26]. They stated that “[…] subjects in groups may have 
been less afraid of fire […] than solitary subjects”.  
People unfamiliar with a place will most certainly use the main entrance, whereas staff 
entering through side entrances on a daily basis, prefer to use those during evacuations [20]. If 
a close relationship between patrons and waiters/waitresses exists and they know alternative 
exits this relationship can lead to a use of exits being closer than the main entrance. The 
patrons assume that the waitress working in the same location every day has a profound 
knowledge of the evacuation design and can guide them to safety. This is exactly what 
happened in the Beverly Hill Supper Club fire [15]. 
  
2.2.4 Social Influence 
In a fire emergency social influence can play an important role, especially concerning pre-
movement time [16]. When speaking about group influences there are mainly two cases 
which need to be distinguished. The first one is the normative influence which means that 
people do not want to make a fool out of themselves and be different from the rest. In an 
uncertain situation for example with very little cues of what is going on and what should be 
done nobody wants to move first. The second one is the informational influence which goes 
hand in hand with the above mentioned behaviour. People are observing what the other people 
around them are doing. When the first person starts evacuating it is likely that others will 
follow since are no longer responsible for setting an example. They cannot make a fool out of 
themselves anymore. 
 
2.2.5 The Role-Rule Model 
In general, everybody has a certain role. This role is associated with a certain set of rules. 
There are for example waitresses working behind the bar who are allowed to serve alcohol 
while the ordinary occupant is not. People’s behaviour in a fire situation is influenced by their 
own expectations that they have of themselves. During the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire the 
staff still perceived themselves as being responsible for the occupants. Prior to the fire 
waitresses were assigned to serve certain patrons. When the fire broke out each waitress 
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instructed “[…] those patrons for whom they had had responsibility prior to the fire“ [15], 
[20]. They actively guided them out. Care needs to be taken since this model cannot be used 
as a precise predictive tool and does not apply in every situation. Not such a close relationship 
between staff and patrons existed in the Summerland fire. The patrons mainly exited through 
the main entrance whereas the staff mainly exited through the alternative exits, which they use 
on a daily base to enter the premise [20]. 
 
2.2.6 The Theory of Affordances 
According to The Theory of Affordances every object, such as an emergency exit, has 4 
different affordances: a cognitive, physical, sensory and functional one [27], [28]. The Theory 
of Affordances can be used to understand why for example some emergency exits function 
better than others [29]. It is important to understand this theory in order to avoid conflicts. All 
information given to people in a fire situation should be as simple as possible [30], [31]. 
Sensory affordance refers to the ability to see or sense an object [28]. This means for example 
the visibility of an emergency exit. An emergency exit should be visible in any given 
condition. This can be achieved by luminescent cues or a painting that is in contrast to its 
surrounding environment. Another possibility would be flashing lights catching the attention 
of the occupants in case of an evacuation alarm. These measures have to be applied 
individually and adapted to each situation [27].  
Cognitive affordance refers to the ability to understand an object [28]. Understanding of an 
emergency exit begins with signage. The signs should be easily understood and leave no room 
for interpretation. Experiments carried out by Lund University have shown that the use of 
green flashing lights attract the attention of occupants and can help in a fire emergency [27]. 
The test participants stated that the colour green helped to convey the message of the 
emergency exit leading to a safe place. Complexity should be kept out of a design. An 
emergency exit should be designed as simple as possible in order to avoid misunderstandings. 
Physical affordance refers to the physical possibility of using an object [28]. An emergency 
exit that is difficult to open, opens against the direction of the egressing flow, is blocked by 
obstacles or is locked and therefore hinders/inhibits a safe evacuation should be avoided. The 
usage for people with disabilities should be considered [27]. 
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Functional affordance describes how the individual's goal can be fulfilled in conjunction with 
the other affordances [28]. Sometimes this goal can be difficult to describe. In case of a fire or 
other situations demanding an evacuation a possible goal is to evacuate as fast as possible. 
The functional affordance combines all other affordances. If an emergency exit is easy to see, 
understand and use, it is functional. An emergency exit should therefore be provided with a 
powerful combination of sensory, cognitive and physical affordances [27]. 
It is important to mention that conflicting affordances can occur and should be avoided. An 
example for a cognitive conflict can be that an emergency exit is marked as such but has a 
sign on the door saying “staff only” or “no admittance”. Occupants might misinterpret the use 
of the door. A conflict between physical and cognitive affordance could be the use of a push 
handle while the door needs to be pulled to be opened. Conflicting affordances are named 
misaffordance [32].  
 
2.3 Panic 
The word “panic” often appears in the media when describing a fire emergency. In the field of 
fire safety it was stated that “the concept of panic is a myth meant to blame the outcome of a 
tragedy on the occupants when in fact the building design or its management were possibly at 
fault” [33]. Experts claim that panic occurs very seldom and that the term panic is often 
misused by society and media as well as by some people closely concerned with the concept 
[30], [34], [35]. Quarantelli even questions “whether there is still any scientific justification 
for the continuing use of the concept in any technical sense“ [34]. In order to get a better 
understanding of the concept of panic it first needs to be defined. In the literature several 
different definitions can be found. Quarantelli defines panic as “an acute fear reaction 
marked by loss of self-control which is followed by non-social and nonrational flight” [10]. 
Goldenson (as cited in [33]) defines panic as a “reaction involving terror, confusion and 
irrational behaviour precipitated by a threatening situation”. Another definition is given by 
Keating who states that there are four elements of panic: “a) hope to escape through 
dwindling resources; b) contagious behaviour; c) aggressive concern about one’s own safety; 
and d) irrational, illogical responses” [30].  
In [33] different examples and case studies where the word panic was used for describing 
logical or rational behaviour are presented. In some cases people are described as panicky by 
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others. Sometimes people describe themselves as panicky. One example is the Beverly Hills 
Supper Club fire in the USA of 1977 in the in which 164 people died [15]. The newspaper 
headlines described the reason for the large loss of life as “people trapped in panic”. 
Interviews with the survivors clearly indicate that their behaviour was far from irrational or 
nonrational. The staff rationally informed the customers of the danger and guided them 
towards the exits. They were untrained for fire emergencies and there was no evacuation plan. 
In the interviews several people have been described as panicking when smoke or heat 
penetrated them which led to a rush towards the exits. This seems to be a rational action under 
these circumstances [3], [15], [33]. For a fire in a nursing home where five people died it was 
reported that the fire alarm was shut off to prevent people from panicking [33]. According to 
[36] this is not an uncommon practice.  
Panic is often used to describe a person’s behaviour after an incident after acquiring more 
information than the person had at the time [35]. In a fire emergency decisions need to be 
made quickly based on the available information. For an observer these decisions can look 
irrational but maybe were rational considering the information the person had at the time [33]. 
Experts state that information is important for an early decision making and weighing of 
options by the occupants. With early received information it is possible to realize the 
seriousness of an incident much faster [37].  
 
2.4 The Influence of Alcohol 
Alcohol does not only impair the reaction time but can also impair cognitive abilities and 
decision making significantly, depending on the dose [11], [12], [13]. Even small amounts can 
lead to impaired ability and/or functionality. When people consume a large amount of alcohol 
they make more mistakes when performing simple tasks [38]. The amount remains 
unspecified in the report. 
A two day experiment on cognitive functioning under the influence of alcohol was performed 
in 2012 and is presented in [39]. In this experiment, six different tasks were performed by 56 
different participants, 32 males and 24 females. The participants were between 18 and 45 
years old. On the first day these tasks were presented to and completed by the participants 
three times without the intake of alcohol. On the second day another training session was 
followed by the performance of the tasks with different Blood Alcohol Concentrations 
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(BACs); 0.048%, 0.082% and 0.1%. Three out of the six tests showed a significant sensitivity 
towards alcohol, already under the effect of the lowest tested BAC of 0.048%. The results for 
the so called Inspection Time (IT) task as well as the Self-Ordered Pointing Task (SOPT) 
show a clear correlation between the BAC and degree of impairment. The IT task is a measure 
for the speed of information processing whereas SOPT can be used to measure the working 
memory function. Another test, the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART-CO) 
showed impairment under the effect of the lowest BAC as well. The change of degree of 
impairment with increasing BAC was very little. SART-CO measures the “vigilance for and 
inhibition of response to rare events” [39]. Also the results for the Useful Field of View Test 
(UFOV) show a clear relation between the BAC and the degree of impairment. The degree of 
impairment with the lowest tested BAC is not as significant as for the previously addressed 
tasks. The UFOV is a measure for the speed of processing as well as divided visual attention. 
The results show that all cognitive abilities that have been tested suffer under the effect of 
alcohol. Some are more sensitive than others, but all are being negatively affected [39].  
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3. Evaluation of Selected Nightclub Fires 
In this section the following nine past nightclub fires are analysed with the goal of identifying 
the critical factors that influenced the outcome.  
 Kiss, Brazil, 2013 
 Lame Horse Club, Russia, 2009 
 Santika, Thailand, 2009 
 Luna, Scotland, 2009 
 República Cromañón, Argentina, 2004 
 The Station, U.S.A., 2003 
 The Fine Line Music Café, U.S.A., 2003 
 La Goajira, Venezuela, 2002 
 Gothenburg Dancehall, Sweden, 1998 
Those fires have been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, they represent a wide range of 
different types of nightclubs. They range from rural to inner-city venues. Secondly, the 
incidents are from all over the world and therefore from countries with different regulations 
and a different state of the art concerning fire safety. Thirdly, the incidents happened 
relatively recent, the oldest one in 1998, and therefore provide a good basis for improving the 
current situation regarding nightclub safety. There were some disastrous incidents leading to a 
high number of fatalities earlier in history like the Cocoanut Grove Nightclub fire in 1942 
resulting in 492 fatalities [3]. These cases will not be regarded here since some adjustments of 
regulations have already been made after those fires occurred and the goal of this thesis is to 
improve the safety of currently existing nightclubs and those that will be built in the future.  
However, there have been more recent nightclub fires than those that are analysed. For some 
the information is very limited and that is why they have been discarded in the analysis. In 
December of the year 2000, 309 people died in the Chinese city of Luoyang. The nightclub 
was located on the 4
th
 floor. A welding accident in the basement led to the tragic incident 
[40], [41]. In 2008, 43 people died in the reportedly overcrowded Wuwang Club in Shenzhen 
in China. Both nightclubs have been reported to have operated illegally [41]. These are just 
two examples of less well documented incidents that have not been analysed. Another 
incident worth mentioning is the crowd crush in the E2 nightclub in Chicago which happened 
on February 17
th
 2003 [42]. There was a fight and a security officer used pepper spray 
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intending to end the fight. Some occupants shouted “terrorist attack” and “poison gas”. Some 
occupants saw others vomiting or passing out which prompted people to rush toward the exit. 
A subsequent crowd crush on the staircase led to 21 deaths and 50 injuries. The most recent 
documented nightclub fire happened on New Year’s Eve 2013 in the Neighbours nightclub in 
Seattle [43]. An arsonist set fire to gasoline he had poured over the staircase leading to the 
upper bar. However, sprinklers and fire extinguishers were able to control the fire and no one 
was killed or injured.  
 
3.1 Kiss, Brazil, 2013 
On the 27
th
 of January 2013, a fire occurred in the nightclub “Kiss” in the city of Santa Maria 
in Brazil. The venue was hosting a popular rock band. The fire started due to the use of 
pyrotechnics and led to 241 fatalities, mainly students, and over 600 injuries [44]. The 
information presented is based on newspaper articles. 
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The one storey venue had two adjacent buildings, one on the left and one on the right side. No 
connection that could be used as an escape route existed. The nightclub had only one exit, it 
was a dead-end configuration. In front of this exit there were metal barriers designed to let 
people in slowly and in a controlled way. The nightclub had no windows. After the main 
entrance the occupants could go directly to the stage area on the left or to the main area of the 
nightclub, straight ahead. The area in front of the stage was elevated and could be reached via 
a stair or ramps. The difference in height to the rest of the venue is unknown. In the main area 
there were some possibilities to sit as well as two bars and two toilet areas. Another bar area 
was located in the back [45].  
In the newspaper articles it is not mentioned that the nightclub had a fire alarm, an automatic 
suppression system, a smoke and heat control system or emergency lighting. The nightclub 
was equipped with fire extinguishers. The number is unknown. The one that was used on that 
night was malfunctioning. The fuel load mainly consisted of the wooden stage itself, 
polyurethane foam and curtains [46]. 
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According to the police and witnesses the nightclub was overcrowded [47], [48]. The exact 
number of occupants varies from source to source. In [44] and [49] it is stated that the venue 
had a capacity of 1000 occupants while more than 2000 were in the building. Also [47] 
mentions 2000 occupants. In [50] it is stated that 1000 people were inside the building while 
the capacity was 690. The numbers differ but all of the sources indicate that the nightclub had 
exceeded maximum occupancy.  
 
 
Figure 3: Layout of the Kiss nightclub; The flame indicates the origin of the fire; The arrows indicate the 
movement of people; Figure is based on [45] 
In the aftermath it was found that the nightclub’s public-health license and fire-safety plan 
had expired in August and that the fire brigade had not done checks for several months [47], 
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[49]. The owner applied for an extension and the club was allowed to continue operating. The 
Brazilian regulations require a minimum number of two exits for a nightclub [51]. Questions 
arose about how a club without basic safety precautions could have obtained a license in the 
first place [50]. It should be mentioned that, in Brazil, it is common practice that patrons have 
to tab their expenses and pay when exiting. This was also the case for the Kiss nightclub [44]. 
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
The fire started at about 2.15 a.m. when a member of the band lit a pyrotechnic flare and 
ignited the soundproofing non-fire-retardant polyurethane-foam at the ceiling. From there the 
fire and smoke rapidly spread throughout the building. In one article it is mentioned that the 
fire cut off the power supply which left the venue in darkness [50]. The band was handed a 
fire extinguisher but it did not work. In [49] it is mentioned that parts of the roof collapsed 
and trapped several occupants inside.  
Some witnesses stated that the guards at the door refused to let people leave without paying, 
but as soon as they realized the seriousness of the situation they actively helped people to get 
out of the building. Other witnesses said that the guards did not stop people from exiting. One 
witness said that some people knocked over the security guard and opened the door [46]. The 
metal barriers in front of the entrance slowed down the evacuation even further. As a result of 
everybody trying to exit through the main entrance, there was a crowd crush. Firefighters had 
to break through the wall to enter the venue [50]. Witnesses stated that, during the evacuation, 
people mistook doors leading to dead-ends for emergency exits. At least 50 bodies were found 
in the bathrooms [45], [46]. In [52] it is mentioned that over 180 people were found in the 
bathrooms. Several people tried to find refuge in refrigerators [47]. According to a medical 
professor at least 90% of the deaths were caused by smoke inhalation [46].  
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Image 1: The inside of the Kiss nightclub after the fire; Large amounts of debris can be seen in the back of the 
image; Image taken from [53] 
Shortly after the incident several nightclubs in Brazil have been checked. Random checks in 
29 nightclubs in Sao Paulo revealed that 9 were running without a license while 8 were not 
even registered [50]. Owners are often discouraged from obtaining a license as the application 
process can take years. Additionally, a registered nightclub needs to pay taxes. 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
Even though the Kiss nightclub was allowed to continue operating after applying for an 
extension of its license, it violated the law by only having one exit, instead of the mandatory 
two. The fire and smoke could spread so rapidly due to the fact that non-flame-retardant PU-
foam was used and was ignited by a pyrotechnic flare. There was no evidence of a detection 
and alarm system, an automatic suppression system or a smoke and heat control system. The 
attempts to extinguish the fire failed because the fire extinguisher did not work. The nightclub 
was overcrowded. The nightclub had a dead-end configuration. There were metal barriers in 
front of the entrance slowing down the evacuation. The power supply was cut by the 
advancing fire and the lights went out.  
The entrance area that was supposed to be used by the large number of occupants can be seen 
in the following images. 
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Image 2: Entrance area of the Kiss nightclub from the outside after the incident; Image taken from [54] 
 
Image 3: Entrance area of the Kiss nightclub from the inside after the incident; Image taken from [55] 
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3.2 Lame Horse Club, Russia, 2009 
In the early hours of December 5
th
, 2009 a fire broke out in the “Lame Horse Club” in the city 
of Perm in Russia. On this particular night the 8
th
 anniversary of the nightclub was being 
celebrated. The fire started due to a pyrotechnic display that was lit on stage which ignited the 
ceiling. A total of 156 people died and 100 were injured [56]. The sources used for this 
analysis are mainly newspaper articles but also different video footages from the night itself 
and the news. These videos show the venue both before and during the initial phase of the fire 
[57]. 
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The nightclub was located in a one storey building and had a surface area of 500 m² [58]. The 
nightclub had two exits, the main entrance and a rear exit. At the main entrance there were 
two double swing doors placed behind each other. On the evening of the fire only one leaf of 
each double swing door was open. The rear exit was not signed as an emergency exit while 
the main entrance was [59]. In [60] windows are mentioned. It is unknown if those could be 
used for an evacuation or not. The videos show many tables and chairs at the venue [57], [61].  
In the video that was shot during the incident it is not possible to hear a fire alarm [57]. The 
building had no automatic suppression system [62]. Fire extinguishers or a smoke control 
system are not mentioned in any of the reports or videos. The building’s interior finishing 
consisted mainly of wood; the ceiling was decorated with twigs [59], [63].  
The nightclub had a capacity of 450 people. In total 282 people were invited to the party. The 
exact number of occupants is unknown [60]. According to [62] there were more than 200 
people within the venue. In no article it is reported that the venue was overcrowded. The 
pyrotechnical devices used for this party were not certified for indoor use, only for outdoor 
use [62]. The nightclub had already received two fines after failing fire safety inspections one 
year earlier [60]. People living close to the building accused the fire brigade of corruption and 
of approving the safety standards of the venue for the past 8 years [62]. The nightclub 
expected a fire safety inspection in the following week [59]. 
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Figure 4: Layout of the Lame Horse Club; The exact location of the rear emergency exit is unknown; The flame 
indicates the origin of the fire; Figure based on [61] 
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
The fire was started by a pyrotechnic display which ignited the wooden brushwork on the 
ceiling when “[…] a performance artist juggled so called cold-flame pyrotechnical maces” 
[57], [63]. The pyrotechnic display was not certified for indoor use [62]. Due to the choice of 
materials the fire and smoke spread quickly throughout the nightclub [59].  
When the situation became apparent to the guards they tried to open the second leaves of the 
double swing doors at the main entrance to improve the egress. Some of the staff members 
exited through the backdoor. It was not known to ordinary guests. Officials stated that most of 
the victims died of smoke inhalation [64]. 
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Image 4: Burning ceiling in the Lame Horse Club; Image taken from [57] 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The nightclub did not fulfil the required safety standards and therefore operated illegally. The 
pyrotechnic display that was used was certified only for outdoor use. The choice of materials 
led to an easy ignition and a rapid spread of fire and smoke. There was no evidence of a 
detection and alarm system, an automatic suppression system, a smoke and heat control 
system or fire extinguishers. The rear emergency exit was not signed and ordinary occupants 
did not know about it. The full width of the main entrance was not available as the second 
leaves of the door were initially sealed.  
 
3.3 Santika, Thailand, 2009 
During a New Year’s Party on the night from December 31st to January 1, 2009 a fire 
occurred in the very popular nightclub “Santika” in Bangkok, Thailand. The fire began due to 
the use of pyrotechnic igniting combustible material at the stage. The fire killed 66 people and 
injured 236 [65]. Sources for this incident include an investigation report carried out by the 
Center of Education and Research on Advanced Fire Safety Science and Technology in East 
Asia, journal and newspaper articles and video footage.  
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Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The nightclub was a free standing steel-framed building with two stories above and one storey 
below the ground [65]. The inside of the club was divided into three main areas. The 
separated VIP area consisted of two stories and a staircase in the area itself. The entrance to 
the VIP area was at the back of the south side terrace. Another main area was the mezzanine 
level above the seating area. From the U-shaped mezzanine level people could look onto the 
stage and the seating area. The third area was the actual ground floor [65]. The floor level on 
the ground floor was uneven. At the centre of the guest area there was a circular shaped area 
which was lowered by 40 centimetres. The terrace on the east side was raised by 30 
centimetres. The whole guest area was 90 centimetres lower than the entrance hall. In order to 
connect the different levels there were stairs with two to five steps depending on the 
difference in height.  
The building had three major evacuation routes, the main entrance and two 70 cm wide doors 
leading to the east side terrace [65]. There were corridors behind the stage that could have 
been used for evacuation purposes but since the fire originated in between the crowd and the 
alternative ways of evacuation it would have been very difficult to exit there without a 
member of the staff who was familiar with the building. On the east side there were six tall 
and 70 cm wide windows. The height is not specified. Two of these windows served as doors 
and were part of the major evacuation route. The investigation report is not clear on the 
condition of the other eastern windows. In the text it says that they did not have a handle to 
open, but that the glass was broken and the windows used to escape. The layout presented in 
the report indicates that they were iron barred. There was a lobby leading to the southern 
terrace. On the south side there were four windows that were secured with iron bars and could 
not be used for evacuation. There were several windows on the east and south side on the 
mezzanine level but they were secured with iron bars as well and could not be used for 
evacuation either. 
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Figure 5: Floor plan of the main floor of the Santika nightclub; The flame indicates the origin of the fire; Figure 
based on [65] 
There were several tables placed in a semi-circular way around the lowered centre of the guest 
area [65]. Small counters for drinks were placed close to each other. The connection from the 
seating area to the main entrance was narrow, enough for normal use, but not wide enough for 
an evacuation.  
The following image gives an impression of what the nightclub looked like. It should be 
mentioned that the picture was most certainly not taken on the night of the incident. In the 
video of the night no tables in front of the stage can be seen [66]. 
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Image 5: An impression of the area around the stage of the Santika nightclub; Image taken from [67] 
 
The nightclub had only a few lighted exit signs and no emergency lighting. The building was 
not equipped with a detection and alarm system, an automatic suppression system or a smoke 
and heat control system. The building was equipped with several fire extinguishers.  
It was estimated that 1000-1200 people were in main area of the club [65], [68]. According to 
[68] the maximum number of occupants based on the NFPA 101 Life Safety Code would 
have been 898. Reports describing the area as "densely packed" testify to the fact that the 
venue was overcrowded. At the time Thailand's regulations did not specify occupancy limits 
[68]. 
During an investigation carried out by the Ministry of Justice it was found that the building 
was licensed as a residence and not as nightclub [68], [69]. For residential buildings, fire 
safety inspections were not required at the time. The club therefore operated illegally. In 2004 
the owners of the nightclub “[…] had applied for a license to operate as an entertainment 
venue [...]”, but were refused by the police. From June 2004 until 17th September 2006 the 
police filed 47 charges against the nightclub. After this date there were no further charges. 
Since then one of the shareholders of the company was a senior police officer. There is no 
evidence of bribes being paid or that the senior police officer used his position to hinder 
police action against the Santika. 
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Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
The fire started minutes after midnight due to a pyrotechnic display on stage which ignited the 
combustible materials near the ceiling [65]. There were no attempts to fight the initial fire or 
give guidance for the evacuation. The fire and smoke spread rapidly to the sides of the venue. 
People became aware of the severity as they felt the radiant heat and saw a cloud of black 
smoke. Soon after the fire broke out there was a power failure and the lights in the nightclub 
went out. Since the venue had no emergency lighting and there were only a few emergency 
exit signs, people had difficulty finding the exits. In the first seconds of the fire people 
believed that it was part of the show. A few people however, including the performers started 
to evacuate immediately.  A while later “[…] a chandelier with a diameter of nearly 10 
meters fell down […]” from the ceiling and crushed a considerable number of people in front 
of the stage to death [65]. The exact number is unknown. The chandelier can be seen intact in 
Image 5 and as debris in Image 7. 
The VIP room was located close to the stage and burned down very quickly [65]. The 
evacuation route from the VIP room was obvious, directly leading to the terrace and not many 
victims were found here. Since the windows on the mezzanine level were secured with iron 
bars the occupants had to use the staircase leading to the entrance hall. There, the flow of 
people merged together with those coming from the area in front of the stage. The evacuation 
was slowed down by the complex geometry of the venue as well as by the furniture 
obstructing the escape. An unknown number of people locked themselves into different rooms 
on the ground floor and tried to prevent the intrusion of smoke into their shelter. This worked 
and they were saved by the rescue service. 
The staircase leading to the entrance hall where several egressing flows merged resulted in a 
bottleneck [65]. Thirty-two fatalities were found around the main entrance [68]. In total 55 
out of 66 people died in the building while the other 11 died at a later stage. 
The fire was reported to a police station at 00:20 a.m. while the first rescue service received 
calls at 00:40 [68]. Due to heavy traffic they did not arrive before 00:48 a.m. When the fire 
fighters arrived, they were unable to access the site immediately, as numerous taxis and 
patrons in their cars blocked the entrance.  
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Image 6: The staircase leading to the entrance hall of the Santika nightclub; Image taken from [65] 
 
Image 7: The area around the stage of the Santika nightclub after the fire; Image taken from [70] 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The nightclub was licensed as a residence; therefore operated illegally and did not fulfil the 
fire safety requirements. The fire started due to the pyrotechnic display and was able to spread 
so rapidly because of the materials used at the ceiling. There was no fire alarm, automatic 
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suppression system or smoke and heat control system. The main area of the nightclub was 
overcrowded. The means of escape were not sufficient for the number of people. This is 
especially true for the main entrance. Additionally, tables and drinking counters obstructed 
the evacuation. Shortly after the fire started the lights went out. Since the nightclub did not 
have emergency lighting and only few lighted exit signs, the occupants had difficulty finding 
the exit. The evacuation itself was complicated by the complex and uneven design of the 
building. A huge chandelier fell from the ceiling and killed an unknown number of people. 
Furthermore, the fire and rescue work was delayed. The fire department was alerted 20 
minutes after an emergency call had reached the local police station. 
 
3.4 Luna, Scotland, 2009 
On January 1
st
 2009, during a New Year’s party, an incident happened in the “Luna” 
nightclub in Edinburgh, Scotland. Nobody died and only three people were mildly injured by 
falling melted plastics. There was no need to take them to the hospital. Since no major 
damage occurred there are not many sources for this incident. It is still interesting to do a 
short analysis because of the human behaviour that was captured on a video [71]. Due to the 
limited information, the structure for this analysis is different. 
The nightclub was equipped with a fire alarm, but besides that one can only speculate about 
fire safety precautions. On the particular night there were 400 occupants in the venue [72]. No 
overcrowding was mentioned. 
According to the newspaper, indoor pyrotechnics set fire to the plastic netting on the ceiling 
shortly after midnight. The plastic melted and dropped to the floor. The occupants did not 
seem to be impressed by the events and continued dancing. People were singing the anthem 
“the roof is on fire” [71]. Some were walking right through the falling debris. The fire alarm 
sounded 1 minute and 11 seconds after the video started. It is unknown how long the fire 
burned before the video was recorded. Most people kept a minimum distance to the falling 
debris, also as the fire spread and the debris covered more and more of the floor area. After 2 
minutes and 30 seconds, two people, presumably staff, instructed the occupants to leave. 
People seem to follow these instructions. Apparently the configuration of the nightclub, 
especially concerning materials, prevented the fire from spreading rapidly. The fire growth 
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rate seems to be slow compared to some of the other, more catastrophic fires that have been 
presented. 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The fire began when the ceiling materials were ignited by a pyrotechnical device. The choice 
of materials however did not allow a rapid spread of fire and smoke. The instructions of the 
staff helped to get every occupant out.  
 
 
Image 8: Burning debris in the Luna nightclub; Image taken from [71] 
 
3.5 República Cromañón, Argentina, 2004 
In the late evening of the 30
th
 of December 2004 a fire broke out in the nightclub República 
Cromañón in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The nightclub was hosting a popular rock band. The 
fire broke out due to a flare that was lit by somebody within the crowd of fans. In total 193 
people died. The exact number of injuries is unknown and reports vary widely. In the newest 
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newspaper article 1400 injured people are mentioned [73]. This chapter is mainly based on 
newspaper articles as well as the official judgment by the jurisdiction of Buenos Aires.  
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The nightclub was located in a two-storey building. The main entrance was located on the 
lower floor and led to the outside. Right behind the main entrance there were six doors 
leading to the main area of the nightclub. Four of them were locked. A connection to a nearby 
hotel was on the same level. The emergency exit on the lower floor was locked with a padlock 
[74]. This exit was marked with an illuminated exit sign. Another exit was located next to the 
stage but was not used by many. A fence in front of the stage was blocking the way to this 
exit.  
There are no reports of a detection and alarm system, emergency lighting, an automatic 
suppression system or a smoke and heat control system. Ten out of the fifteen fire 
extinguishers that were in the venue were depressurized and could therefore not function. Out 
of the remaining five, three were sealed and one had expired. The nightclub had a ventilation 
system that consisted of four fans above the stage designed to exchange air. Two of the fans 
were sealed by masonry [74]. 
The club’s interior finishings consisted of polyurethane foam, some highly combustible 
materials and cotton wool. The walls were insulated with a layer of polyurethane foam on top 
of a layer of highly combustible cotton wool [74]. It is not reported whether the polyurethane 
foam was flame retardant or not. 
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Figure 6: Layout of the República Cromañón nightclub; The flame indicate the origin of the fire; Figure based on 
[75] 
On the particular night there were approximately 3000 people in the venue while the 
nightclub was allowed to host a maximum of 1031. The minimum number of occupants 
within the venue was found to be 2811 [76]. Other sources indicate an allowed number of 
1300 but also indicate more occupants [77]. In [74] it is stated that three times as many people 
as allowed entered the venue. Witnesses stated that it was very crowded and that moving was 
partly not possible. Also minors were granted permission to enter the nightclub by the guards 
even though the nightclub sold alcoholic drinks and was therefore not allowed to let minors 
enter [76]. The nightclub’s fire safety license had run out in November and needed to be 
renewed by the fire department. This did not happen.  
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
Somebody within the crowd lit a flare which ignited the ceiling. When the combustible 
materials caught fire, toxic gases were produced and quickly spread through the venue. The 
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technical institution INTI calculated the level of toxicity based on the materials and volume of 
the building [74]. They found a level of 225 ppm of cyanide in the air. A lethal dose for lab 
rats lies in between 150 ppm and 220ppm. The light went out shortly after the fire started. It is 
unknown whether this happened due to the fire or if someone switched them off purposefully 
[74]. 
Witnesses reported that people were jumping over each other and that some occupants fell on 
the ground and were trampled. Those who managed to exit the venue tried to help the fire 
fighters and paramedics [77]. Many people were attracted by the emergency exit sign light 
above the locked door. According to survivors, the firefighters opened this door 40 minutes 
after the fire began, however, the firefighters state it was less. Most of the victims were found 
around that area [74]. A lot of people were under the influence of alcohol [78]. Many people 
ran towards the toilets on the upper floor instead of trying to make their way towards the 
exits. Most of the fatalities were due to smoke inhalation [77]. 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The nightclub did not have an approved fire safety concept. The fire was started by a 
pyrotechnical device. The choice of materials led to an easy ignition as well as to a fast spread 
of fire and smoke. There was no evidence of a detection and alarm system, an automatic 
suppression system or a smoke and heat control system. The fire extinguishers, except for 1 
out of 15, were not functioning. The nightclub was overcrowded. The emergency exit on the 
lower level was locked. Of the 6 doors leading to the main entrance four were locked which 
hindered the evacuation even further. The exit at the stage was blocked by a fence. Shortly 
after the fire started the lights went out making orientation and evacuation more difficult.  
It is mentioned that a lot of people were under the influence of alcohol. It is not known if this 
had a negative effect on the evacuation or not. 
 
3.6 The Station, U.S.A, 2003 
On the 20
th
 February 2003, a fire broke out in The Station nightclub in West Warwick in 
Rhode Island in the U.S.A. The Station was hosting several bands. The fire broke during the 
main act of the night. The band started their performance with a pyrotechnic display which 
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ignited the soundproofing foam of the stage. From there the fire and smoke spread rapidly 
throughout the whole club resulting in 100 fatalities and over 200 injuries. A detailed 
investigation report is available [79]. In the aftermath of the fire, 355 witnesses were 
interviewed [80]. In the night of the fire a video was shot by WPRI-TV [81].  
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The Station nightclub was a freestanding single storey wooden framed building constructed in 
1946 [79]. Since then, the owner and function changed numerous times. Throughout its 
history it was a restaurant, a pub and a nightclub. It is worthy to note that it was first built as a 
nightclub. It had an area of 412 m².  
The building had four exits - the main entrance and three alternative exits [79]. The main 
entrance was located on the northern side; two emergency exits were located at the eastern 
side and another one close to the platform at the western side of the building. A ramp and 
stairs were installed at the main entrance. The side exits led to stairs as well. In front of the 
main entrance there was a railing that people faced when exiting. They could either go left 
and use the stairs or go right and use the ramp. The width of the double-door main entrance 
and the corridor were the same. About halfway down the corridor a single door led to a small 
ticket area. Just before the ticket area the corridor was connected to the main bar area. Behind 
the ticket area the corridor led to the concert area.  
The windows of the buildings were mainly on the north side, on the left, and the right side of 
the main entrance. The windows left of the entrance were double-hung while those on the 
right side of the entrance were sunroom-type windows. At the southern side of the building, 
small windows were installed in both the restrooms and offices, but they were secured with 
bars. Behind the main entrance a short corridor was located.  
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Figure 7: Layout of The Station nightclub; The flames indicate the origin of the fire; Figure based on [79] 
 
 
Figure 8: The north side of The Station nightclub; Figure based on [79] 
 
The building was equipped with heat detectors, manual fire alarm boxes and horn and strobe 
notification units. Although they functioned properly during the fire, they were not linked to 
the local fire brigade [3]. There was no automatic suppression system or smoke and heat 
control system. At the time an automatic suppression system was required only for newly 
built nightclubs, but not for existing buildings, such as The Station. Moreover the building 
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was equipped with several portable fire extinguishers. The staff did not receive any training 
on how to act during a fire emergency [80]. 
The interior finishing most certainly consisted of painted surfaces, wooden panelling, and 
expanded foam plastic insulation. “The wood structure and panelling in the nightclub were 
estimated to contain over 95 per cent of the fuel load [...]” [79]. Soundproofing polyurethane 
foam was installed on the interior walls and around the platform.  
The maximum number of allowed occupants for the venue was 404, if all tables and chairs 
were put aside. This was done on the particular night [3]. The minimum number of occupants 
was 455 considering the 355 witness statements that were collected and the 100 fatalities [79]. 
This leads to the conclusion that the club was overcrowded. This was confirmed by a number 
of witnesses describing The Station as “[…] uncomfortably crowded […]”. Other witnesses 
reported that the nightclub was crowded, but not uncomfortable; some stated that only the 
area close to the stage was crowded. Only three out of 355 witnesses stated that the nightclub 
was not crowded [80].  
After interviewing the witnesses it became apparent that not all exits were easy to see. The 
exit in the kitchen was only visible to those in the kitchen or to those looking through the 
food-pass window behind the front entry way. The exit close to the stage was at least partly 
blocked by a large speaker. The only visible exits were the main entrance and the emergency 
exit in the main bar. Above each exit illuminated signs were installed. In the video it appears 
that the sign above the exit next to the stage was not lit [81], [80]. 
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
At about 23:07 the band started their performance by setting off a pyrotechnic display. The 
sparks ignited the soundproofing foam in the alcove where the drummer was located. From 
there the fire and smoke spread rapidly. In the first seconds the fire was misinterpreted as 
being part of the show. This was stated by 80 survivors [80]. As seen in the video the first 
reactions to the fire occurred at around 10-20 seconds after ignition [81]. After 25 seconds, 
the flames reached the ceiling and the occupants started to evacuate. The band became aware 
of the danger and stopped playing 30 seconds after the fire had started. The alarm went off 
and the emergency strobe lights began to flash 41 seconds after ignition. The fire department 
received calls reporting a fire in less than a minute.  
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After approximately 90 seconds, the smoke layer descended to ca. 0.3 m above of the floor. It 
was found afterwards that conditions in the middle of the area in front of the stage were lethal 
by that time. Patrons and the staff were breaking the windows in both the main bar and the 
sunroom in order to evacuate. Around 100 seconds after ignition, the main entrance became 
jammed with occupants. Those who escaped tried to help those who were trapped in the 
crowd crush [79]. In less than six minutes after ignition, flames were seen at the front door 
and the windows.  
In total, eight people tried to fight the fire with both water and fire extinguishers, but their 
attempts were ineffective [80]. Some employees tried to get fire extinguishers from different 
locations within the building, but the fire developed too rapidly for an efficient use when they 
returned.  
The bouncer of the band tried to block the exit close to the stage for evacuation [80]. Under 
normal circumstances it was reserved for the band. Some people went through it regardless. 
Others turned around and went to the main entrance.  
In total, 169 witnesses reported that they faced obstructions during the evacuation [80]. For 
most of them the crowdedness, as well as the crowd crush at the main entrance, were the main 
issues. Out of the survivors, 74 mentioned that they were on the ground at one point during 
the evacuation. They had fallen, were knocked down or dropped down in order to breathe 
more easily. 
For 347 out of the 355 witnesses, the exit choice could be identified [80]. Out of these 347 
witnesses, 127 exited through the main entrance. Some of the survivors stated that they used 
this exit because it was the only way that they knew. Sixty-two others attempted to use the 
main entrance to evacuate but in the end they exited through windows or the bar exit. They 
later stated that it was too crowded around the main entrance.  
The majority of fatalities were found around the main entrance. At least 50% of the survivors 
exited through the main entrance or tried to do so [80]. A problem was the single door and the 
ticket desk within the corridor reducing the effective width available for evacuation [79]. 
Twenty-six fatalities were found in the southern part of the nightclub which was a dead-end 
configuration. 
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Figure 9: Location of fatalities in The Station nightclub; The flames indicate the origin of the fire; Figure based on 
[79] 
 
 
Image 9: Crowd crush in the main entrance of The Station nightclub; Image taken from [82] 
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Image 10: The pyrotechnic display igniting the soundproofing foam at The Station nightclub; Photo Credit: Daniel 
Davidson (Copyright holder); Image taken from [82] 
 
 
Image 11: Initial fire at The Station nightclub; Photo Credit: Daniel Davidson (Copyright holder); Image taken from 
[83] 
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Identified Critical Factors 
The rapid spread of fire and smoke was due to the materials in the building that were easily 
ignited by a pyrotechnical display. There was no automatic suppression system or smoke and 
heat control system. There was no fire extinguisher close enough to the stage to allow a 
suppression of the fire. The nightclub was overcrowded. The main entrance had a too low 
capacity. The emergency exits were partially not visible and not well signed. A door in the 
corridor and a ticket desk reduced the useable width of the corridor leading to the main 
entrance even more. Instead of running to the exits, some people ran into the southern part of 
the club, which was a dead-end.  
 
3.7 The Fine Line Music Cafe, U.S.A., 2003 
On February 17
th
 2003, a fire occurred in the Fine Line Music Cafe in Minneapolis in the 
U.S.A. The fire started because the combustible ceiling of the venue got ignited by a 
pyrotechnic display used by a rock band [84]. This sounds all too familiar but there is one 
major difference when comparing this fire with others. In this fire not a single person died or 
got injured. Under normal circumstances little would have been heard about this incident. 
What made it interesting for the media and investigators is the fact that The Station nightclub 
fire happened only three days later and people wanted to know what made the difference. Due 
to the limited information, the structure for this fire is different from the other analyses. 
The Fine Line Music Cafe was equipped with an automatic suppression system even though 
the regulations did not demand it [84]. The staff had trained regularly for evacuating the 
building. In fact they had a fire safety training earlier on the same day. In total there were 120 
guests in the venue. The premise has not been reported overcrowded.  
As part of the show, a band member shot a pyrotechnic display which ignited the ceiling and 
rapidly went from the smouldering stage to engulfing the ceiling in flames [84]. The staff 
reacted quickly and managed to guide everybody out safely in less than two minutes. 
Additionally sprinklers controlled the fire. The occupants were very calm. Debris started 
falling down shortly after people left the mezzanine level. The manager stated he did not 
know that the band wanted to use pyrotechnics. 
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Identified Critical Factors 
The fire started because a pyrotechnical device ignited combustible materials at the ceiling. 
The main factors that led to a successful evacuation were the employees who were trained for 
this situation and managed to guide everybody out quickly and the sprinklers that controlled 
the fire. 
 
3.8 La Goajira, Venezuela, 2002 
On the 30
th
 of November 2002 a fire broke out in the La Goajira nightclub in Caracas, 
Venezuela. In total, 47 people died and 12 were injured. Newspaper articles and a newscast 
are the only sources for the analysis of this incident [85], [86]. 
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The nightclub was located in the basement of a hotel. The venue was divided into two rooms. 
It did not have any emergency exits; the main entrance was the only exit. There were no 
windows that could have served as additional exits. The nightclub was equipped with some 
fire extinguishers, but reports indicate that they were defective [85]. There are no reports of a 
detection and alarm system, an automatic suppression system or a smoke and heat control 
system. An unlicensed kitchen with improvised wiring was located close to the main entrance 
[87]. The materials used in the venue are not specified, but it can be said that the materials in 
the kitchen were of such a nature that a large amount of smoke was produced.  
There were 400 occupants in the venue. The exact capacity of the nightclub is unknown but it 
was overcrowded according to the investigators [87]. Nightclubs in that area seldom comply 
with regulations and also this nightclub did not fulfil the safety standards [85]. 
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Image 12: The main entrance of the La Goajira nightclub; Image taken from [88] 
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
At about 01:00 a.m. a fire in the kitchen started due to faulty wiring [86]. The kitchen was 
located close to the main entrance. According to witnesses, there were attempts to extinguish 
the fire but the fire extinguishers malfunctioned. The people rushed to the only exit. 
Witnesses reported trampling [87]. However, the exit was quickly blocked by the rapidly 
developing fire, which trapped the occupants inside. The fire fighters were able to save some 
occupants with the help of oxygen tanks [87]. Most of the fatalities were due to smoke 
inhalation [85]. 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The nightclub did not follow the regulations and did not fulfil the safety standards. The faulty 
wiring in the unlicensed kitchen led to the ignition. Whether a simple detector in the kitchen 
would have improved the situation is subject to speculation. The only exit was located close 
to the fire origin and got quickly blocked by smoke. There was no evidence of a detection and 
alarm system, an automatic suppression system and a smoke and heat control system. The fire 
 
40 
 
  3. Evaluation of Selected Nightclub Fires 
extinguishers were malfunctioning. The venue was overcrowded. Having only one exit, the 
venue was a dead-end configuration.  
 
3.9 Gothenburg Dancehall, Sweden, 1998 
On October 28th 1998 a fire incident during a Halloween party in a dancehall in Gothenburg 
occurred. The dancehall was located on the 2
nd
 floor. The fire originated in one of the two 
staircases leading to the dancehall, where furniture was stored. In this incident, 63 people died 
and 180 were injured. Official investigation reports by the Swedish government as well as the 
NFPA are the main sources for the analysis [89], [90]. 
 
Description of the Building and the Situation Prior to the Fire 
The free standing building was built in the 1930’s and had several different types of 
occupancy in its lifetime, but also when the fire occurred [90]. The part in which the party 
was held had two storeys, while the other part of the building had only one. In the 1990s the 
second floor was converted into a dancehall. It was not a regular nightclub. The building had 
two exits which had illuminated signs above the door. Apart from the exits there were eight 
unobstructed windows on the northeast side of the building which were 2.2 m above the floor. 
The windows had dimensions of 1.8 by 0.8 m. Three of these windows had a vertical drop of 
6 m to the ground level; the other five were above an adjacent roof. There were five windows 
on the opposite side, but they were secured with bars. 
In the building there was one main staircase directly leading to the outside and one rear exit 
leading to a corridor in the single storey part of the building [89]. Right in front of the main 
staircase on the second floor there was a ticket desk as well as two other tables in the corridor. 
A stage was located at the rear exit. The DJ booth was located on the stage.  
 
41 
 
  3. Evaluation of Selected Nightclub Fires 
 
Figure 10: Layout of the dancehall in Gothenburg; The flame indicates the origin of the fire; Figure based on [89]  
 
 
Figure 11: 3D layout of the dancehall in Gothenburg; The flame indicates the origin of the fire; Figure based on 
[90] 
The building did not have any detection and alarm system or automatic suppression system. 
Fire extinguishers are not mentioned in the reports. The ventilation of the room was controlled 
by an exhaust fan with a capacity of 3800m³/h. It is unknown whether the ventilation was on 
or off on this particular night. Additionally, two fans were located in the kitchen [89].  
The building was mainly built out of concrete and masonry block. Suspended acoustic tiles 
were used for the ceiling. Flags and other decoration were reported to have been in the main 
 
42 
 
  3. Evaluation of Selected Nightclub Fires 
hall. “The interior wall finish was non-combustible plaster finish and possibly combustible 
wood panelling“ [90]. Several chairs and tables, which were partly made of combustible 
material, were located in the main hall. Many tables, chairs etc. were moved from the main 
hall to the rear staircase to make more space for the party. The main fire load was located in 
the rear staircase. The fire load within the dancehall was relatively small [89]. 
The estimated minimum number of occupants was 398 [89]. In the aftermath of the fire the 
local fire department stated that they would have allowed only 150 people into the party in 
order to ensure a safe evacuation. Witnesses stated that the party was overcrowded. There are 
reports of people stating that it was not possible to dance and that people were standing 
shoulder to shoulder [90]. 
In 1998 in Sweden it was necessary to get a permit for a party where admission is charged. 
The fire service then would have estimated the maximum number of allowed occupants. In 
the case of this party, no permit was obtained. Tickets were sold. The party therefore 
happened illegally [89], [90]. 
 
Description of the Incident and Human Behaviour 
In the aftermath it became apparent that the fire was arson committed by four teenagers who 
were denied to enter the party [91]. The fire originated in the rear stairwell. Combustible 
materials, mainly wooden furniture, were stored in the rear stairwell to make more room for 
the party. From there the fire spread into the main hall and ignited the furnishings and 
decorations [90].  
The fire was manually detected by one of the two DJs who opened the door to the rear 
staircase and saw the fire. It is not certain whether he was the first to detect the fire or not. It is 
unknown whether he closed the door after his discovery or left it open. The fire brigade was 
alarmed at around 23:42. Two instructions were made by the DJs. One was: “Fire, Run, Out” 
while the second one was “Fire, don’t panic, take it easy, but everybody should go”. Some 
people followed that advice while most remained dancing [89]. The DJs started disconnecting 
their stereo equipment. After one of the DJs realized he would not be able to make it through 
the dense crowd in time, he broke a nearby window and jumped on the roof of the adjacent 
building [90]. The music kept playing. The announcement of the fire was commented on as 
being “cool” by an unknown person via microphone. Somebody started rapping a popular 
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song. People continued dancing afterwards. The DJ gave out another warning. He seemed to 
be stressed.  
Some witnesses mentioned popping light bulbs and seeing smoke as first cues to the presence 
of a fire [90]. Others mentioned smelling the smoke and being irritated by it, as first cues. 
Some mistook it for a smoke machine. One patron wanted to investigate the ambiguous cues 
further and checked whether the fire was a real threat or not. He burned himself at the 
doorknob and left the door partially open. When black smoke entered the room everybody 
rushed to the exit [89].  
Out of the survivors that were interviewed after the incident, 62 occupants took the first 
warning serious while 159 did not. For 88 people data is missing. Survivors stated that 
especially the ticket desk at the main staircase had caused problems and slowed down the 
evacuation for about a minute. The high pressure on the main entrance resulted in a crowd 
crush [89]. 
When the fire fighters arrived at around 23:49 p.m. a large number of people were outside of 
the building blocking access to the scene. The officer had to walk in front of the fire truck and 
instruct people to clear the way [90]. The crowd was actively hindering the work of the fire 
fighters. There are reports of fire fighters being assaulted. “Police officers were required to 
restrain and control the crowd to allow fire personnel to operate” [90]. 
Several people jumped out of the windows in the second floor that had a 6 m vertical drop. 
After jumping or being pushed by those behind them they lay injured on the ground, which 
made it impossible for the fire fighters to place ladders and operate quickly. Twenty-three 
were found dead in a room that served as the cloakroom close to the staircase. Some entered 
voluntarily while others were pushed inside because the pressure on the main escape route 
was immense [89]. Most of the fatalities were due to inhaling smoke [90]. 
The investigation board of the incident found that if there would have been a detection system 
in the staircase the disaster would have been most likely avoided [89]. 
 
Identified Critical Factors 
The organizers failed to get permission for the party and operated illegally. The arsonists were 
able to start this fire because there was enough fuel stored in the rear exit. There was no 
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evidence of a detection and alarm system, an automatic suppression system, a smoke and heat 
control system and fire extinguishers. The dancehall was overcrowded. Only the main 
entrance and several windows were available for the evacuation. The ticket desk in the 
corridor leading to the main entrance slowed down the evacuation for about a minute. The 
majority of the occupants did not take the warnings announced by the DJs seriously. When 
the fire fighters arrived they were hindered in their work by the conditions on-site.  
 
3.10 Critical Factors 
Nine different nightclub fires have been analysed and the critical factors that influenced the 
cause of events identified. Even though each case had a unique configuration, several factors 
remain similar. In all cases, it has never been just a single factor leading to the disaster or a 
positive outcome but always a combination of different factors. 
Table 1: Overview of the identified critical factors  
Nightclub Identified Critical Factors Fatalities Injuries 
Kiss  Nightclub operated illegally  
 The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
 Rapid spread of fire and smoke  
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system, 
automatic suppression system and 
smoke & heat control system 
 Only 1 out of 15 fire extinguishers 
functioned 
 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Only one exit 
 Dead-end configuration 
241 > 600 
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 Metal barriers in front of the exit 
 Lights went out (No emergency lighting) 
Lame Horse Club  Nightclub operated illegally 
 The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
 Rapid spread of fire and smoke  
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system,  
automatic suppression system, 
smoke & heat control system and 
fire extinguishers 
 Means of egress  
 Emergency exit not signed and only 
known to staff 
 Main entrance’s width reduced by 
initially sealed 2
nd
 leafs of the main 
doors 
156 100 
Santika  Nightclub operated illegally 
 The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
 Rapid spread of fire and smoke  
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system,  
automatic suppression system and 
smoke & heat control system 
 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Too low main entrance capacity 
66 236 
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 Bad signage of emergency exits 
 Tables and drinking counters 
obstructed the evacuation 
 Complex geometry 
 Lights went out (No emergency lighting) 
 Falling chandelier 
 Delayed firefighting and rescue 
operations 
Luna  The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
 Slow fire spread  
 Instructions by staff 
0 3 
República 
Cromañón 
 Nightclub operated illegally 
 The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
 Rapid spread of fire and smoke  
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system,  
automatic suppression system and 
smoke & heat control system 
 Fire extinguishers malfunctioning 
 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Emergency exit locked 
 Four out of six doors leading to the 
main entrance locked 
 Stage exit not available 
 Lights went out (No emergency lighting) 
193 1400 
The Station  The use of pyrotechnics  
 The choice of materials  
100 >200 
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 Rapid spread of fire and smoke  
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Fire extinguishers not close enough 
to the fire origin 
 No automatic suppression system 
 No smoke & heat control system 
 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Too low main entrance capacity 
 Kitchen and stage exit partially not 
visible 
 Bad signage of emergency exits 
 Door and ticket desk in main 
corridor 
 Dead-end configuration 
The Fine Line  The use of pyrotechnics  
 Training of staff 
 Manual & automatic protection systems 
 Automatic suppression system 
0 0 
La Goajira  Nightclub operated illegally 
 Faulty wiring in kitchen caused fire close 
to the entrance 
 The choice of materials 
 Rapid spread of fire and smoke 
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system, 
automatic suppression system, 
smoke & heat control system and 
fire extinguishers 
47 12 
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 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Only one exit 
 Dead-end configuration 
Gothenburg 
Dancehall 
 Party happened illegally 
 Arson 
 Manual & automatic fire protection 
systems 
 Lack of a properly functioning 
detection and alarm system, 
automatic suppression system, 
smoke & heat control system and 
fire extinguishers 
 Occupant load 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress  
 Only main entrance and several 
windows available for egress 
 Desks in the evacuation route 
 Warnings not taken seriously 
 Delayed firefighting and rescue 
operations 
63 180 
 
The table shows that out of the 9 analysed fires 7 were started by a pyrotechnical device. Two 
of these fires had no fatalities. Therefore, 5 out of 7 fires that led to fatalities were started by a 
pyrotechnical device. Those were the 5 deadliest fires of those presented. In these cases the 
nightclubs’ interior finishing consisted of combustible material which enhanced the rapid 
spread of fire and smoke. Within 90 seconds the conditions in the middle of the area in front 
of the stage of The Station nightclub were untenable. While numbers are not present for the 
other incidents, the newspaper articles and reports indicate a rapid spread as well. 
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In case of the fires with fatalities, 6 out of 7 times the nightclub operated illegally. In most of 
the cases, not even basic fire precautions were present. The Santika nightclub was not even 
registered as a nightclub, but as a residence. In several cases the nightclubs had to pay fines 
but were allowed to continue operating. In 6 out of 7 cases with fatalities, the venue was 
overcrowded. 
For all cases with fatalities, the manual and automatic protective systems were insufficient. 
For most venues no detection or alarm system, automatic sprinkler system or smoke & heat 
control system has been reported. It is not known whether or not these systems were present, 
but if they were they were not functioning properly. In several cases there were attempts to 
extinguish the initial fire; these were ineffective mainly due to malfunctioning fire 
extinguishers. It should be noted that while in some cases the attempts to extinguish failed in 
other cases there were no extinguishers at all. Naturally it will be more difficult to protect a 
club from arson but if the organization in the nightclub in Gothenburg would have been such 
that the staircase hasn’t been used as storage for combustible materials the likelihood of such 
a disastrous outcome would have been lower. 
Many of the identified critical factors are connected to the means of egress. In the Kiss and La 
Goajira nightclub, only one exit was available. In other cases more exits existed, but they 
were not fully available. In the Lame Horse Club, the 2
nd
 leafs of both doors at the main 
entrance were initially sealed. In the República Cromañón fire, the emergency exit and 4 out 
of 6 doors leading to the main entrance were locked. The stage exit was not accessible. In the 
Lame Horse Club, the Santika and The Station nightclub, the emergency exits were badly or 
not signed. Two of the exits of The Station were only partially or not at all visible. In the 
Gothenburg Dancehall fire, the rear exit was unavailable because it was the fire origin. For 
The Station as well as the Santika nightclub, especially the main entrance capacity was too 
low. In a few cases there were obstructions in the escape route. Metal barriers outside of the 
main entrance of the Kiss nightclub slowed down the evacuation. During the evacuation of the 
Santika nightclub tables and drinking counters were obstructing the evacuation routes. In The 
Station nightclub, there was a ticket desk in the main corridor which additionally got 
narrowed down by a door. A railing outside of the main entrance further obstructed the 
evacuation. In the Gothenburg dancehall fire, tables were located in the evacuation route 
leading to the main entrance. An issue connected to too few emergency exits or a not very 
well implemented fire safety concept can be the problem of a dead-end configuration. This 
was the case for all the clubs with only one available exit as well as for The Station nightclub. 
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A complex geometry as in the Santika nightclub can slow down an evacuation. During the 
Kiss, Santika and República Cromañón fires the lights went out making orientation even more 
difficult. These nightclubs were not equipped with emergency lighting. It is unknown whether 
the other nightclubs had emergency lighting or not. 
The factors leading to the positive outcomes of the Luna and The Fine Line Music Cafe fires 
were the use of non-combustible materials and instructions given by the staff, in case of the 
Luna club, and an automatic suppression system and trained staff in case if The Fine Line 
Music Cafe.  
As most dominant critical factors the illegal operations of nightclubs; the use of pyrotechnics; 
the choice of materials; manual & automatic fire protection systems; the occupant load and 
the means of egress were identified. In all fires with fatalities, the manual and automatic 
protection systems as well as the means of egress were insufficient. The training of staff was 
another factor that was found to greatly improve evacuations, but was not listed as its absence 
can have negative consequences. 
In a lot of cases, the different human behaviour models & theories can be linked to what 
happened. For the Luna and The Fine Line Music Cafe fire the occupants left the building 
following the instructions of the staff. A role rule model applied. For The Station nightclub 
fire, it was verified that most people tried to exit through the main entrance which links to the 
Affiliation Model. Similar observations were made for the Santika fire. The Theory of 
Affordances applies for all cases where the emergency escape routes were badly signed or not 
functional. It is obvious that in all cases with fatalities the ASET was smaller than the RSET.  
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4. Evaluation of Evacuation Experiments  
In this section three different evacuation experiments from Lund University and the 
University of Ulster are evaluated. The chosen evacuation experiments are presented because 
they are set in nightclub environments and therefore suited to develop further understanding 
of an evacuation in a nightclub environment. 
 
4.1 Lund University 
In 2011, two evacuation experiments in a nightclub environment were carried out by Nasr and 
Wall [14]. The experiments took place in two different nightclubs in Lund, Sweden. Club A is 
a one storey building. Club B, additionally to a floor on the street level, has a basement which 
directly leads outside as well. Even though the nightclubs are similar, the experiments had one 
major difference. In Club A, the guards and staff were instructed to actively improve the 
evacuation, by instructing and pushing the occupants while in Club B the guards and staff 
were told not to do so. Cameras were installed prior to the experiments. There were two 
observers in each premise to observe the evacuation. In Club A, a voice alarm system was 
installed with flashing lights next to it whereas in Club B an ordinary fire alarm was installed. 
Outside of the club a survey was carried out and the BAC was measured. This happened 
voluntarily. Blankets were provided for the occupants to cope with the weather conditions.  
 
Figure 12: Layout of Club A from the evacuation experiment carried out by Lund University; Figure based on [14] 
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Figure 13: Layout of Club B from the evacuation experiment carried out by Lund University; Figure based on [14] 
 
The Evacuation in Club A 
The estimated number of occupants for Club A was 100-150. As soon as the voice alarm 
sounded the light was turned on and shortly after that the music was turned off. On the dance 
floor the alarm was not heard by any of the observers before and after the music was turned 
off. The voice alarm got lost in the high level of noises of the occupants. The flashing lights 
that were placed next to the fire alarm were not perceived by any of the observers. People did 
not seem to understand an evacuation was ongoing. Many occupants were standing on the 
dance floor and waited until the guards verbally instructed people to leave or actively pushed 
them out. The people in the smoking area refused to leave until a guard actively pushed them 
out. The people at the bars were not motivated to evacuate. Many were waiting for their 
drinks. The main entrance got jammed for a short period because people stopped to get their 
jackets from the closet. The guards pushed the occupants out efficiently. Only six people used 
the rear exit.  
 
The Evacuation in Club B 
The estimated number of occupants for Club B was 150-200. The evacuation started with the 
fire alarm being triggered. Shortly after that the lights went on. The alarm was heard clearly 
first in the lounge, whereas on the dance floor only after the music was shut off. At first, the 
occupants did not know how to behave and looked around waiting for other people to react. 
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Several people in the lounge remained seated on the couch and used their mobiles; they did 
not seem to have any desire to evacuate. A lot of people queued in front of the closet to 
retrieve their jackets. Even after 10 minutes into the evacuation there was still a long queue. 
In the first three minutes only 20-30 people managed to get out of the nightclub. In total 16 
people used the rear exit. The rear exit was better known to people than in Club A since it led 
to the smoking area. 
 
Results of the Study 
In both clubs the evacuation was very calm and peaceful. The occupants moved in groups. 
Single actions out of a group were very rare. The only stressed movement was when a single 
person ran out of sight of the camera. It is unclear whether that person ran outside or 
somewhere else. People who were at the bar were less motivated to evacuate. Only a few 
people asked for more information about what was going on. 
When comparing the two experiments it can be seen that if the staff and guards are well 
instructed, an evacuation can be greatly improved. On the other hand if no guards or staff aid 
the occupants a very slow evacuation is possible. The fact that people tried to retrieve their 
jackets was most certainly related to the weather conditions. 
The survey after the evacuation shows that everybody in Club B heard the alarm, whereas 
only half of the occupants did so in Club A. Nobody perceived the voice alarm as an actual 
alarm. The survey shows that in both clubs the majority of people have not seen an exit sign, 
despite the fact that there were exit signs. 
Nasr and Wall used three different methods to rate the alcohol consumption of the occupants. 
Firstly, their BAC was measured. Secondly, the occupants were asked how many drinks they 
had consumed. Thirdly, their state of drunkenness was subjectively rated by the person 
conducting the interview.  The average BAC during the interviews was 1.09% and 0.72% for 
Club A and Club B, respectively. They were then asked if they heard an alarm and saw the 
exit signs. The results show, that percentage wise, most people that have been rated as sober 
heard the alarm. The more drunk people were categorized, the less they heard the alarm. The 
same can be said for the ability to see exit signs. These findings are not supported by the 
measured BAC or the number of drinks consumed. Nasr and Wall found that, even though the 
subjective rating shows a clear trend, all methods are not very reliable. The BAC seems to be 
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the most scientific method but it does not take into account the drinking habits. People used to 
drinking might be less affected by the same BAC as a person not used to drinking. 
The authors of the thesis gave several recommendations based on their experiments. Guards 
should be instructed on how to facilitate an evacuation and should point out alternative exits 
in order to prevent congestion at the main entrance. It was found that a voice alarm is 
unsuitable for a noisy environment such as a nightclub. A normal fire alarm yielded better 
responses. Additionally, they suggested that the fire alarm should be connected to the DJ 
booth, directly shutting off the music when the alarm goes off. The cloakroom and bar should 
be closed and not serve occupants anymore as soon as an alarm goes off. Relatively few 
people saw an emergency exit sign. The authors therefore suggest more emergency exit signs. 
 
Additional Remarks to the Original Analysis  
The original video footage that was used for the above described experiments was analysed 
another time with focus on the critical factors identified in chapter 2 [92]. There are several 
factors that led to tragedies that do not apply in this case. The nightclubs were operating 
legally. The nightclubs had several exits. They did not seem overcrowded. There was no 
pyrotechnical show. In several nightclub fires that have been evaluated in chapter 2, it was 
found that the emergency exits were poorly signed. According to the surveys that were carried 
out this was the case in this set of experiments as well. In a real fire smoke can block the 
visibility of the signs even more. 
In the evacuation experiments, people queued up for retrieving their jackets which slowed 
down the evacuation. In the Lame Horse Club and the Gothenburg dancehall, the cloakroom 
was located in the corridor leading to the main entrance, but there are no reports of people 
slowing down the evacuation by queuing for their jackets. The cues of being in a dangerous 
situation were much stronger in the fire incidents than in the experiments. 
The main point that was found during a second analysis is, that the behaviour of the staff was 
of great influence on the behaviour of the occupants. In both sets of experiment the staffs 
were not participating in the evacuation. In the videos it can be seen that waiters/waitresses 
clean the counters or collect bottles while the evacuation was ongoing. In Club A people were 
actively approached by the security guards and instructed to leave the building while in Club 
B they were not. The behaviour of the staff in both clubs, apart from the guards instructing the 
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occupants in Club A, was a contradictory cue to being in a dangerous situation, as indicated 
by the fire alarm. Even though it was a non-dangerous situation it clearly shows how 
influential the behaviour of employees can be. This is being supported by a set of evacuation 
experiments in different retail stores in the UK and by the outcome of the Beverly Hills 
Supper Club and The Fine Line Music Cafe [15], [84], [93].  
 
4.2 University of Ulster 
In
 
1997, an evacuation experiment was carried out in a pub called Dick’s Cabin in Ireland 
[94]. This particular pub was chosen because, at the time, it was very popular among the local 
teenagers. The aim of the experiment was to provide data on characteristics and movement as 
well as the behaviour of people during an evacuation from a licenced pub or club. For the 
analysis, video cameras were installed prior to the evacuation. No interviews with the 
occupants were performed. 
The premise has a floor area of approximately 250 m² with three main areas as well as 
interconnecting areas [94]. The Lounge and the Public Bar are located in the front of the club 
and can be accessed via the front entrance leading into the Lounge. The front entrance has a 
width of 1 m. A function room is located in the back of the club. From there an exit with a 
width of 1.2 m leads via a concrete stair to a yard from which another street can be reached.  
In the nightclub’s license, the maximum number of allowed occupants per room is described 
[94]. Even though the whole premise was licensed to hold more occupants, the function room 
was overcrowded. In a comment by the management it became clear that the amount of 
people on that night was low compared to other nights. 
Table 2: Occupancies for Dick's Cabin; Based on [94] 
Location Allowed number of 
Occupants 
Number of Occupants on 
the night 
Evacuation Time [s] 
Lounge Bar 125 76 180 
Public Bar 60 15 120 
Function 
Room 
120 150 400 
Total 305 241 400 
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The fire brigade and police were informed and kept updated throughout the evacuation [94]. 
Within the premise, only the bar manager, the owner and the research author had knowledge 
of the ongoing events. The employees were not informed about the evacuation. The doormen 
were generally instructed to assist the occupants in the event of an evacuation and open all 
exits.  
 
Figure 14: Layout of Dick's Cabin; Figure based on [94] 
 
The Evacuation 
The alarm started at 0:25 [94]. Along with the alarm, the music stopped and the flood lights 
were switched on. The light in the function room operated with 16 seconds delay. Those 
sitting started the evacuation at 60 seconds and those standing at 45 seconds after the alarm 
went off. Following the alarm, the staff forced the patrons to leave the premise by the closest 
exit. The staff was blocking the linked corridor leading to the front exit and forced the patrons 
to use the rear exit. This happened despite the fact that some patrons made verbally clear that 
they wished to use the other main entrance because the rear exit was unfamiliar and seemed 
unfriendly to them. There was congestion at the rear exit.  
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In total, 16 announcements were made during the evacuation. Most information was given to 
the occupants in the function room using a P.A. system. The people in the front of the 
building received only two announcements. In several cases, occupants were going to the 
toilet while the evacuation was ongoing. In the worst case, a female went to the toilet 130 
seconds into the alarm and exited 50 seconds later. In another case a male re-entered the 
premise at 220 seconds when the doorman was distracted.  
 
Additional Remarks to the Original Analysis 
One critical factor that was identified in chapter 2 was overcrowding. In most analysed 
nightclub fires one maximum number of occupants is mentioned. This experiment shows that 
single rooms can be overcrowded without the maximum capacity of the venue being reached. 
Further on, it is questioned by the author of the original report whether the codes are 
conservative enough in their allowed number of occupants. BS5588:6 allowed even more 
occupants than there already were in the function room on that night, 177 in total, as stated in 
[94]. It should be kept in mind that it already took the existing number of 150 occupants, 400 
seconds to evacuate and that congestion occurred [94]. BS5588:6 was replaced by 
BS9999:2008 where areas that are designed for dancing/clubs/assembly have an assigned 
floor area of 0.5 m²/person; a bar area 0.3, loose seating of 0.75 and loose tables of 1.0 as 
stated in BS9999:2008 [95]. In [94] it is mentioned that the function room has a total area of 
75 m². The exact configuration and what really is included in the 75m² is unknown. From the 
layout it is assumed that both the bar area and the raised seating areas are included. It is 
estimated that the allowed number of occupants for the function room using the current 
regulation is 125, which is just slightly bigger than the number being mentioned in the license, 
but much less than estimated by the author using the old regulation BS5588:6.  
Alcohol did not seem to have an effect on the movement of people. However, people were 
instructed to use a certain exit. In a real situation this is not necessarily the case. Alcohol can 
then affect the exit choice [94]. The familiarity with the main entrance, as well as the negative 
perception of the rear exit, lead to the conclusion that more people would have used the front 
exit if they had not been prevented from doing so. Apart from the venue being partly 
overcrowded and that exit choice was limited by the instructions of the guards, none of the 
factors identified in chapter 2 applied for this evacuation. 
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5. Current State of the Art of the Regulatory Basis 
In this section, it is analysed how the regulations in the U.S.A. and the UK address the critical 
factors that have been identified as most dominant.  
 
Illegal operations of nightclubs 
It lies within the scope of the enforcing authorities to control illegal operations of nightclubs. 
The NFPA, 101 Life Safety Code states that code is be enforced by the authority having 
jurisdiction [96]. The enforcing authorities for fire safety in the U.S.A. are the fire 
departments. In the UK the authorities for the enforcement of fire safety are the fire and 
rescue service [97], [98]. 
 
The use of pyrotechnics 
In the U.S.A. the use of fireworks in a nightclub environment is regulated by NFPA 1126 
[99]. In this standard, the circumstances under which indoor pyrotechnics are allowed are 
defined. The facilities in which fireworks are being used need to be in compliance with the 
NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. The use of indoor pyrotechnic is to be individually approved by 
the authority having jurisdiction. Furthermore, the number and placement of fire extinguishers 
and other minor safety precautions are regulated. In the UK the use of fireworks is regulated 
by a number of different regulations, such as BS 7114, The Fireworks Regulation 2004 and 
others [100], [101], [102]. In these regulations fireworks that are typically displayed on a 
stage are not defined. 
 
The rapid spread of fire and smoke due to the choice of materials 
In the U.S.A., guidance on resistance of the structure and use of materials is given in the local 
building codes and NFPA 5000 [103]. The interior finishing is regulated in the NFPA, 101 
Life Safety Code [96]. In the UK this general guidance on the required fire resistance of the 
materials can be found in the Approved Document B as well as BS 9999:2008 [95], [104]. 
The required resistances can be lowered when using an automatic sprinkler system. 
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Insufficient manual & automatic fire protection systems 
If the occupant load exceeds 300, the nightclub needs to be equipped with an approved alarm 
system. Following The Station nightclub fire, all newly built nightclubs in the U.S.A. are 
required to install an automatic sprinkler system [96]. For an occupant load over 100, an 
automatic sprinkler system is also required for existing buildings. A smoke controlling system 
is required if a stage is installed that exceeds 93 m². Portable fire extinguishers are not 
required, also not for existing buildings that do not require a sprinkler system. In the UK, a 
manual fire alarm system is mandatory, not an automatic one [105]. Sprinklers are not 
required, but can lead to a relaxation of other requirements [95], [104]. Provisions for smoke 
and heat control are mentioned but only to protect the fire-fighting and rescue operations. Fire 
extinguishers are specifically recommended for so called “first-aid fire-fighting”, but are not 
required. 
 
Overcrowding  
The problem rather than the determination of the allowed maximum number occupants is to 
make sure that not more occupants than allowed are within the venue and single rooms. This 
point needs to be regulated by the authorities. The occupant load for the U.S.A. is determined 
using the so called occupant load factor, which depends on the exact usage of a certain area 
within the venue, i.e. dance area or sitting area [96]. The surface areas of the individual areas 
are then divided by the according occupant load factor and summed up in order to get the 
allowed number of occupants. The allowed number of occupants for each room needs to be 
posted near the main exit of this room. In the UK, the so called floor space factor is used in a 
similar way [95], [104].  
 
Insufficient means of egress  
In the U.S.A., a minimum number of two escape routes from “[…] any mezzanine, story, or 
portion thereof […]” is required [96]. The exit width depends on the type and number of 
occupants. Following The Station nightclub fire, where most people tried to exit through the 
main entrance, the main entrance/exit width of a newly built nightclub must now have a 
capacity of 2/3 of the maximum occupant load. For already existing nightclubs, the main 
entrance must have a width that can cope with one half of the maximum occupants [96]. 
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Dead-end corridors are restricted to a length of 6.1 m [96]. In the UK, the design of the means 
of egress is regulated in [95] and [104]. A minimum number of two escape routes for every 
storey must be provided. The exit width depends on the risk profile of the type of building and 
the number of occupants. When calculating the exit width, the maximum number of occupants 
needs to be accommodated by n-1 available exits, in case one of the exits is unavailable. In 
the U.S.A. and the UK the exit width must not be less than the width of the corridor leading to 
it [95], [96]. Emergency lighting in the U.S.A is regulated by [96] whereas in the UK three 
different codes regulate this [106], [107], [108]. 
 
The training of staff 
In both the NFPA 101, Life Safety Code as well as BS 9999, training of the employee and fire 
drills are required [95], [96]. In BS 9999, it is mentioned that fire drills should be done when 
most people are inside and should be as realistic as possible. This can, for example, be 
achieved via smoke penetration. 
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An analysis of different incidents and experiments was performed and critical factors 
influencing a fire emergency in a nightclub were identified. In the field of fire safety, most is 
learned from past incidents; therefore the analysis of recent nightclub fires is a good basis for 
finding critical factors. As most dominant critical factors, the illegal operations of nightclubs, 
the use of pyrotechnics, the choice of materials, manual and automatic fire protection systems, 
the occupant load and the means of egress were identified. Additionally the training of staff 
was found to be very helpful. It should be mentioned, however, that it was always a 
combination of factors that influenced the events of each fire. 
Two evacuation experiments were analysed to gain further insight into an evacuation in a 
nightclub environment. Most of the critical factors could not be verified since they did not 
apply in these evacuations. For the evacuation experiment carried out by Lund University, it 
was found that staff can play an important role in an evacuation. Additionally, a voice alarm 
system was found to be unsuitable for a nightclub environment. In the evacuation experiment 
carried out by the University of Ulster, it was found that single rooms can be overcrowded 
without the maximum allowed number of occupants for the whole venue being reached.  
 
6.1 Recommendations for Safety Measures 
The majority of the presented nightclub fires occurred in developing countries. This is also 
true for the majority of recent nightclub fires in general [109], [110]. For Brazil and Pakistan, 
it was found that the regulations of developing countries are not as evolved as those of 
developed countries [111], [112]. This is assumed to be true for the majority of developing 
countries. It is recommended that countries with less developed regulations adapt their 
regulations to more developed ones such as from the NFPA or completely adopt them. This is 
exactly the recommendation given in a study concerned with fire safety in Pakistan [112]. The 
NFPA is promoting this and several countries already use the NFPA’s expertise or their 
complete codes [113]. In response to the Santika fire, Thailand decided to proceed with this 
step [68]. The NFPA Life Safety Code has already been translated into 5 more languages 
other than English.  
 
62 
 
  6. Discussion 
Having a high developed regulatory basis is important, but it will yield no improvement of the 
situation if not aggressively enforced. In a study concerned with the current state of the art in 
Brazil, it was found that apart from the regulatory basis and enforcement especially the fire 
safety culture needs to be improved [111]. It is important that the building owners are made 
aware of the dangers and do follow the regulations also in between inspections. Several of the 
nightclubs presented continued to operate despite expired licenses, filed fines, and official 
knowledge of inadequate fire safety conditions. Additionally, it was found that corruption is a 
problem in developing countries [114]. It is recommended, that the governments implement 
aggressive enforcement, fight corruption and start campaigns to improve the safety culture. 
Also, for the developed countries, it is important that enforcement and fire safety culture are 
constantly improved and/or kept at a high level. 
Additionally, it is recommended that future research continues to develop further 
understanding of the problems connected to a fire scenario in a nightclub environment and 
their solutions. Suggestions for research topics are given in chapter 7. 
 
6.2 Limitations of the Study 
Specific recommendations for safety measures, concerning the improvement of regulations, 
are not given, since most of the nightclub fires with fatalities that are presented here occurred 
in illegally operating nightclubs. It is therefore impossible to say whether the regulations in 
those countries sufficiently address the issues or not, since they were not followed.  
It could be argued that the critical factors identified by analysing specific nightclub fires are 
only valid for specific cases with a similar configuration and not representative of nightclub 
fires in general. However, a wide range of nightclub fires was studied. The venues range from 
rural to inner city clubs and represent different populations with different cultural 
backgrounds and countries from all around the world with a different regulatory basis.  
Official investigation reports have only been used for the analysis of the Santika, The Station 
nightclub and the Gothenburg dancehall fire. All the other analyses are based on newspaper 
articles. It is not certain that the articles correctly describe what happened. It needs to be said 
that even though the referenced newspaper articles often differ in details, the main description 
of the events are the same. Information about nightclub fires without fatalities is very little. 
Two cases were briefly presented, but there might have been more factors to identify if more 
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information was available. The nightclub fires with fatalities that were presented are all very 
extreme cases. The critical factors that were identified led to catastrophic conditions. In less 
catastrophic scenarios, other factors might lead to less severe but still dangerous situations. 
In chapter 3.1, it was found that occupants queuing to retrieve their jackets from the 
cloakroom during an experiment slowed down the evacuation immensely. This was not found 
to be a critical factor in the Lame Horse Club or the Gothenburg dancehall fire where the 
cloakroom was situated in the evacuation route to the main entrance. While the conditions in 
both fires were very severe, in less severe scenarios, this factor may expose patrons to 
considerable, unnecessary risk.  The cues in the experiment were not as strong. It is not 
verified whether this might be a problem in less extreme situations. 
It could be argued, that it is unknown to what extent detection and alarm systems, automatic 
suppression systems or smoke and heat control systems would have improved the situation. 
For most presented nightclub fires, a rapid fire and smoke spread has been reported. During 
The Fine Line Music Cafe fire, an automatic sprinkler system controlled the fire and the 
trained staff was able to guide everybody to safety. Sprinklers as well as the use of fire 
extinguishers also controlled the fire in the Neighbours nightclub fire. It should be said that 
safety cannot be created by simply installing an automatic sprinkler system. The safety 
concept needs to be overall functional. In the fires where pyrotechnics were the ignition 
source, the fire was visible and its severity became apparent in a matter of seconds. The 
occupants started evacuating quickly. For the people who were around the area where the fire 
started, a detection and alarm system would most certainly not have improved the situation. 
During The Station nightclub fire, people started evacuating before the fire alarm went off. It 
needs to be said, that for people in different areas of the venues, such as toilets or rooms other 
than the room of the fire origin, an alarm would have maybe improved the situation. 
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7. Future Research 
A study should be carried out verifying whether or not the addressed measures in the 
presented regulations are sufficient or not. Verification of the sufficiency of measures is very 
difficult since experiments only to some extent represent a realistic scenario. Sadly, most is 
learned from real incidents. Therefore the next nightclub fire that happens hopefully verifies 
that the current regulatory basis, if followed, is sufficient. 
In most of the nightclub fires, a rapid fire spread was enabled by the materials used in the 
building. The time to safely evacuate was short. More research on how to reduce the pre-
movement should be done.  
People need to be guided effectively and fast towards the closest exits. Guidance by signs, 
alarms etc. should be such that people intuitively do the right thing without having to think. 
Research on what is the optimal design for these instalments needs to continue. The 
experiments presented in chapter 3.1 have already verified that a voice alarm system is 
unsuitable for a nightclub environment. Further research on optimal design should consider 
the human behaviour theories such as the affiliation to the main entrance, the findings of the 
nightclub fire analyses, as well as the effects of alcohol and other drugs. To gain as much 
transferable knowledge as possible, the experiments should be carried out as realistically as 
possible. 
Apart from not following regulations, nightclubs are sometimes not even registered. This was 
the case for the Santika nightclub. Additionally, this is supported by the governmental checks 
in Brazil in the aftermath of the Kiss nightclub fire. For obvious reasons it is easier to control 
nightclubs that are registered. A study should be carried out quantifying the number of 
unregistered nightclubs as well as trying to give an answer to the following question: How can 
it be guaranteed that nightclubs are registered? 
It would be interesting to study the effectiveness of fire safety enforcement, especially in 
developing countries and to then use the input for improvement towards or maintenance of 
high enforcement standards. Furthermore, it is questioned how the following of regulations 
can be guaranteed in between inspections if the owners are unwilling to follow those, and how 
it is possible to sensitize the owners of nightclubs to the subject of fire safety and improve the 
current fire safety culture in general.  
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Initially, a survey concerning night club safety was planned to be in this thesis. Due the lack 
of time, it was disregarded. The idea remains. The purpose of this survey is to estimate the 
current level of safety in nightclubs all around the world. If clear results are shown, it could be 
used to increase the awareness of the topic. Simple but fruitful questions, based on the 
identified critical factors, should be developed. Those questions should be designed so that the 
answer can be given with either a yes or no or in numbers with the lowest number being a 
complete disagreement (no) and the highest number being a complete agreement (yes). In 
order to reach a representative amount of people, the idea is to program a webpage in such a 
way that it can be viewed on a smartphone without having to zoom in or out or making 
adjustments to be able to answer it. The idea is that people can answer the survey while being 
in a nightclub. In order to make this survey accessible to a lot of people, it should be 
translated into the most spoken languages. To get a lot of answers from people, it is vital that 
the survey is easy to understand and handle as run for a long time.  
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8. Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to develop safety measures for nightclubs on the basis of critical 
factors. The most dominant critical factors are listed below.  
 Illegal operations of nightclubs 
 The use of pyrotechnics 
 The choice of materials 
 Manual & automatic fire protection systems 
 Overcrowding 
 Means of egress 
Additionally, the training of staff was found to greatly improve an evacuation. In order to 
create a safer nightclub environment the following measures are recommended: 
 Countries with less developed regulations should adapt their regulations according to 
those highly developed such as those put forth by the NFPA or BSI or completely 
adopt them. 
 Developing countries should improve the enforcement of regulations and their fire 
safety culture as well as increase the effort of fighting corruption. Those goals are 
similarly valid for developed countries. 
 Research to develop further understanding of the problems a nightclub faces, in a fire 
scenario, should continue. 
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